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COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF PREDATOR DAMAGE MANAGEMENT EFFORTS TO
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Abstract: Cost-effectiveness of ADC’s predator damage management efforts was identified as an issue of
concern during preparation of an environmental assessment (EA) on predator damage management in
southern Idaho. A specific benefit-cost analysis of ADC’s efforts to protect sheep in southern Idaho was
prepared to address this issue. This analysis involved a comparison of the difference between 1) the value
of livestock losses sustained with a control program in place, plus the costs of implementing the program,
and 2) the value of losses that could reasonably be expected without the program in place. This
difference, divided by the cost to implement the program, provided the benefit-cost ratio. Additional data
on the cost-effectiveness of increased helicopter aerial hunting of coyotes was reviewed from a study
conducted during the early 1970s in Idaho, and from 3 years of helicopter aerial hunting in southeastern
Idaho between 1994-1996. All of these comparisons suggested a positive benefit-cost ratio, ranging from
about 3:1 to about 7:1. Factors influencing cost-effectiveness are discussed.
P a ge s
33-41 in C. D. Lee and S.E. Hygnstrom, eds. Thirteenth
Great Plains Wildl. Damage Control Workshop Proc.,
Published by Kansas State University Agricultural
Experiment Station and Cooperative Extension Service.
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The Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, Animal Damage Control (APHIS-ADC)
program in Idaho prepared an environmental
assessment (EA) in 1996 to assess proposed
alternatives and potential impacts of conducting a
predator damage management program in the
southern portion of the State. As part of this
process, we solicited feedback from the public on
issues or concerns that they wanted to see
addressed in the EA. A wide variety of issues
were identified, and this paper focuses on one of
the most commonly expressed concerns, the
cost-effectiveness of predator damage control
efforts (USDA 1996).
Many critics of predator control efforts,
including a number of the respondents that
commented during our EA process, often make
what they feel are logical comparisons regarding
the cost effectiveness of predator control. One of
these misguided comparisons involves looking at
the cost

of a control program, divided by the number of
animals taken, and finding out that the average cost
per animal taken may be several hundred dollars
(O’Toole 1994). Some advocates of this viewpoint
have suggested that it would make much more
sense from an economic standpoint to simply start
paying a bounty on coyotes, for instance, since
more coyotes could be removed for less money in
this manner. However, bounties simply encourage
harvest of coyotes at times and in places when
coyotes are easiest and cheapest to harvest. The
goal in damage control efforts is not necessarily to
remove maximum numbers of coyotes, but to
resolve depredation problems. Many damage
problems occur at times and in places where it is
very difficult to remove the specific depredating
coyotes.
ADC’s cost per coyote could be
substantially reduced by ignoring those situations
and instead concentrating on removing coyotes

where it could be accomplished more cheaply and
effectively, but this would make no more sense
than establishing a bounty system. A n o t h e r
common misconception expressed by some critics
is that it would make more sense to simply
compensate livestock producers for their losses,
rather than implementing a damage control
program. They typically come to this conclusion
by comparing the cost of ADC’s control efforts
with the value of livestock losses confirmed by
ADC. This logic fails to recognize that the losses
confirmed by ADC constitute only a minor portion
of the total losses, and that this level of loss is
occurring with a control program in place.
Without an effective control program, research
suggests losses would likely be much higher
(Nass 1977, 1980, Howard and Shaw 1978,
Howard and Booth 1981, O’Gara et al. 1983).
METHODS
For purposes of the benefit-cost analysis in
our EA, we used the logical and simplistic
approach taken in an earlier analysis by Pearson
and Caroline (1981). This approach involved a
comparison of the difference between 1) the value
of livestock losses sustained with a control
program in place, plus the costs of implementing
the program, and 2) the value of losses that could
reasonably be expected without the program in
place. This difference, divided by the cost to
implement the program, provided the benefit-cost
ratio.
We limited this analysis to quantifiable
values, and did not include a number of values that
would be difficult to measure. When sheep on
rangelands are repeatedly harassed by predators,
for example, they become extremely skittish. They
do not disperse and feed normally, and therefore
may not find the quality and quantity of feed that
they would have if unstressed, resulting in lower
lamb weights at the end of the grazing season.
This is a form of predator damage, but it would be
difficult to quantify. Wagner (1988) discussed
additional examples of indirect predator damage,
including increased labor costs to find sheep
scattered by predators, and range damage related to
the tighter herding required in response to the
presence of predators. Our analysis likewise did
not consider

the value that some individuals might place on
being able to see or hear coyotes more often when
they visit Idaho rangelands, nor did it consider the
unintentional harm or indirect benefits to other
wildlife species.
We limited our benefit-cost analysis
specifically to ADC’s efforts to protect sheep in the
analysis area during fiscal year (FY) 95 for two
primary reasons.
A critical part of the
determination of benefit-cost is the estimation of
losses that might reasonably be expected in the
absence of a control program. Sheep are the only
class of livestock for which studies have been
specifically conducted to look at this issue. Also,
FY 95 was the first full year for which the Idaho
ADC program had data available from our
computerized Management Information System
(MIS). Availability of data from this reporting
system allowed for close estimation of the amount
of money spent specifically to protect sheep.
A total of four research studies were
conducted in the early 1970s to assess the level of
predator damage that could occur in the absence of
predator control (Henne 1975, Munoz 1977,
McAdoo and Klebenow 1978, and Delorenzo and
Howard 1976). The results of these four studies
were reviewed in ADC’s programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (USDA
1994) to determine what level of predation might
reasonably be expected in the absence of a control
program. Based on this review, the unweighted
average rate of loss to coyote predation cited in
USDA (1994) was 4.5% for sheep and 17% for
lambs. For purposes of our analysis, we chose to
be more conservative and assumed that loss rates
for sheep and lambs could reasonably be expected
to be 4% and 15% in the absence of a control
program.
We relied on data collected by the Idaho
Agricultural Statistics Service (IASS 1996) to
assess the magnitude of sheep losses due to
predation, with a control program in place. IASS
conducts a survey of Idaho sheep producers every
year in January, and collects information not only
on producers’ inventory, but also on the amount of
death and theft loss incurred during the previous
year. Although some of the commenters during
our EA process felt that producers may have a
tendency to overestimate

their predation losses, there is strong evidence to
support the reliability of producers’ estimates.
Average losses attributed to predation by Idaho
sheep producers between 1993-1995 amounted to
about 35% of the total reported death loss (IASS
1996). However, through intensive monitoring
conducted during a study on three typical range
sheep operations in southern Idaho, Nass (1977)
found that predation was actually responsible for
56% of the total lamb losses. Pearson (1986)
reported on several studies that indicated little or no
bias occurred in ranchers’ reporting of losses, and
Wywialowski (1994) likewise found that livestock
producers’ estimates of wildlife-caused damage
were consistent with estimates based on studies
and surveys of predation rates.
IASS (1996) county-by-county sheep
inventory data suggested that approximately 94%
of the sheep numbers in the state were contained in
our southern Idaho analysis area in 1995.
Applying this percentage to their statewide predator
death loss figures suggested that 3,348 adult sheep
and 11,718 lambs were lost due to predation in the
analysis area in 1995. Average value per head,
based on beginning and end of year values for
sheep and lambs was $92.50. Estimated total
value of the losses actually sustained with a control
program in place then equaled $1,393,605.
Total cost of efforts to protect sheep in the
analysis area in FY 95 was determined through a
careful review and tabulation of MIS data. District
Supervisors and their field employees reviewed
MIS summary reports for FY 95 to determine how
many direct control and technical assistance hours
had been spent conducting work to protect sheep
in their districts and in the analysis area.
Approximately three fourths of the total field effort
in Idaho is carried out within the southern Idaho
analysis area. After determining that 75% of the
total direct control hours carried out in the analysis
area were spent protecting sheep, this same
proportion was applied to relevant “task” hours
recorded in MIS reports, so that a pro-rated share
of time spent attending work plan meetings,
preparing weekly reports, working on equipment,
etc., was included as part of the effort to protect
sheep.

All of the hours worked by the entire State
office staff were also pro-rated and included as
sheep protection efforts. Review of MIS aerial
hunting summary reports also allowed us to
determine that 100% of the helicopter aerial hunting
hours and 57% of the fixed wing aerial hunting
hours were flown for protection of sheep. These
percentages were applied to all the ferry time
recorded on the MIS aerial hunting summaries to
include the appropriate pro-rated share of this time
as well. Total cost of the program to protect sheep
in the southern Idaho analysis area during FY 95,
including salaries and benefits for field,
supervisory, and administrative staff, vehicle and
aircraft expenses, supplies and equipment, came to
a total of $664,261.
Using sheep and lamb inventory data and
extrapolated predation loss figures from IASS
(1996), the 3,348 sheep and 11,718 lambs lost to
predation represent 1.5% and 4.9% predation
losses, respectively. If we make the conservative
assumption that losses in the absence of control
would be 4% of the sheep and 15% of the lambs,
then losses would have been an estimated 9,114
sheep and 35,712 lambs. At the IASS (1996)
average value of $92.50/head, the total value of
these losses would have been $4,146,405. The
difference between 1) the value of the actual 1995
losses, plus the cost of the control program, and 2)
the value of what losses could reasonably be
expected to be in the absence of a control program,
divided by 3) the cost of the program, equals 3.14.
The benefit-cost ratio for the ADC program’s
efforts to protect sheep in southern Idaho in FY 95
was approximately 3:1.

Table 1. 1995 actual and projected predation losses for sheep in southern Idaho.
Actual losses with (% Predation)
ADC
Adult Sheep

Projected losses
without ADC

(% Predation)

3,348

(1.5%)

9,114.00

(4%)

Lambs

11,718

(4.9%)

35,712

(15%)

Total Sheep & Lambs

15,066

44,826

$1,393,605

$4,146,405

Total Value
(@ $92.50/head)

Table 2. Benefit-cost ratio for efforts to protect sheep in southern Idaho.
(a) Value of actual ‘95 losses
$1,393,605
(b) Cost of the control program

$664,261

(c) Sum of a + b

$2,057,866

(d) Value of losses that could reasonably be
expected in the absence of a control program

$4,146,405

(e) Difference between c and d
(value of avoided losses)

$2,088,539

$2,088,539 / $664,261 = 3.14
(value of avoided losses ÷ cost of the control program= benefit)

A slightly different approach for
determining cost-effectiveness of one particular
control method was taken during further analysis in
our EA. In this approach, instead of assuming a
specific level of increased loss in the absence of a
control program, we used the actual losses
sustained with a specific level of control in place,
and compared that to the reduced level of losses
sustained when control efforts were increased. We
first reviewed data from a study documented by
Packham (1973) in an unpublished report, wherein
the effectiveness of helicopter aerial hunting of
coyotes to protect sheep in southern Idaho was
assessed from 1972-1973. This study was one of
several undertaken in the western U.S. shortly after
the use of predator toxicants was banned by
Federal Executive Order in 1972. The study
documented the extent and cost of control efforts,
coyotes taken, and lambs lost to coyote predation
on 6 spring sheep ranges in southern Idaho. All 6
of the study areas received control in the form of
trapping, calling and shooting, and denning. Four
of the 6 areas received additional control in the
form of helicopter aerial hunting. In the 4 areas
that received aerial hunting, the aerial hunting effort

during the second year of the study was
substantially increased over the effort expended
during the first year. We looked at the difference
between the numbers of lambs killed by coyotes
during the two years, and compared this to the
increased costs for control. The figures shown in
Table 3 represent the cumulative totals for the 4
aerial hunting areas combined.

Table 3. Combined totals for aerial hunting effort and predation losses on four study areasa,
and resultant benefit from increased effort.
Aerial Control Cost

Coyotes Killed

Lambs Killed by Coyotes

1972

$2,574

32

1,092

1973

$8,079

111

376

Extra dollars spent = $5,505

Avoided losses = 716
Lamb prices averaged $40/head

$40 x 716 lambs = $28,600 in losses avoided
$28,600 / $5,505 = 5.19
(value of avoided losses ÷ cost of additional control = benefit)
aFrom Packham (1973)
In the four areas receiving aerial hunting,
coyote predation on lambs decreased from 1.9% in
1972 to 0.6% in 1973, while in the two areas where
no aerial control was conducted, coyote predation
on lambs increased from 3.8% in 1972 to 5.0% in
1973. The ground control effort on the four aerial
hunting areas was essentially the same during the
two years, but the ground control effort on the two
non-aerial hunting areas was increased from 32 to
59 man days during the second year. Numbers of
sheep and lambs present stayed essentially the
same on all areas during both years.
Catch-per-unit-effort data from ADC’s fixed-wing
aerial hunting efforts across southern Idaho
suggested that coyote populations were increasing
during this period. The number of coyotes taken
per hour of fixed-wing aerial hunting increased
from .9/hr. in 1963 to 3.5/hr. in 1973, and
anecdotal information from the aircraft pilots at that
time indicated a noticeable increase in coyote
numbers from 1970-1974. Given these factors, it
seems reasonable to assume that if aerial hunting
had not been increased in 1973, coyote predation
on lambs probably would have been at least as
great as it was in 1972. Although this comparison
involved only 2 years, the data suggests that for
every additional dollar spent on helicopter work
during the second year, an average of $5.19 worth
of lambs were saved.

We similarly assessed cost-effectiveness of
increased helicopter aerial hunting efforts to protect
sheep on the Caribou National Forest in
southeastern Idaho from 1994-1996. This is an
area where varying levels of helicopter aerial
hunting have been carried out every winter since the
mid-1970s to protect sheep present on forest
grazing allotments during the following summer
months. Federal monies available for conducting
winter helicopter work have declined in recent
years, and the amount spent in 1994 was deemed
inadequate by sheep grazing permittees. They
responded by contributing additional dollars for
helicopter work in 1995 and again in 1996. Table 4
shows the numbers of coyotes taken during ADC’s
aerial hunting efforts, the total cost for this control,
numbers of sheep and lambs subsequently present
in the control area, and the permittee-reported
coyote losses for the years 1994-1996. Summer
time ground control efforts were similar during
these 3 years. Conditions were judged to be
somewhat more conducive to effective aerial
hunting in 1995 and 1996 than they were in 1994
(i.e., better snow conditions may have allowed
finding more coyotes), but we could not
definitively quantify the effect this may have had.

Table 4. Aerial hunting effort and predation losses for cooperating sheep producers on the
Caribou National Forest.
Fiscal
Coyotes Taken
Aerial Control
Sheep & Lambs
Permittee Reported Losses
Year
by Aerial
Cost
in Control Area
Hunting
1994

57

$9,355

51,600

2,024

(3.9%)

1995

137

$16,193

55,700

967

(1.7%)

1996

296

$18,158

52,600

896

(1.7%)

For purposes of this analysis, we assumed
that at least some portion of the reduction in losses
could be attributed not just to the increased aerial
hunting effort in 1995 and 1996, but also to an
assumed increase in relative effectiveness in 1995
and 1996 due to better aerial hunting conditions.
Although we can only speculate about the degree of
this effect, we estimated that the percent predation
loss would have been as much as 25% lower in
1994 if there had been a similar level of relative

effectiveness. Under this assumption, losses in
1994 would have only been about 2.9% rather than
3.9%, for a total of only 1,496 sheep and lambs
killed instead of the reported 2,024. Tables 5 and 6
show comparisons of this assumed lower predation
loss rate for 1994 with the actual loss data from
1995 and 1996. These comparisons suggest that
for every additional dollar spent for aerial control in
1995, about $7.19 worth of sheep and lambs were
saved, and about $6.34 worth of sheep and lambs
were saved for every additional dollar spent in
1996.

Table 5. Comparison of aerial hunting effort and predation losses for 1994 and 1995, and
resultant benefit from increased effort in 1995.
Aerial Control Cost

Coyotes Taken

Sheep & Lambs Killed by Coyotes

1994

$9,355

57

1,496

(2.9%)a

1995

$16,193

137

967

(1.7%)

Extra dollars spent = $6,838

Avoided losses = 529

Sheep & lamb 3-yr avg. value of $93/head (IASS 1996)
$93 x 529 = $49,197 in losses avoided
$49,197 / $6,838 = 7.19
(value of avoided losses ÷ cost of additional control = benefit)
aAdjusted down from the actual 3.9% loss level based on the assumption that the percent predation loss
would have been as much as 25% lower in ‘94 if there had been a similar level of relative effectiveness per
unit of effort during both years.

Table 6. Comparison of aerial hunting effort and predation losses for 1994 and 1996, and
resultant benefit from increased effort in 1996.
Aerial Control Cost

Coyotes Taken

Sheep & Lambs Killed by Coyotes

1994

$9,355

57

1,496

(2.9%)a

1996

$18,158

296

896

(1.7%)

Extra dollars spent = $8,803

Avoided losses = 600
Sheep & lamb prices averaged $93/head
$93 x 600 = $55,800 in losses avoided

$55,800 / $8,803 = 6.34
(value of avoided losses ÷ cost of additional control = benefit)
aAdjusted down from the actual 3.9% loss level based on the assumption that the percent predation loss
would have been as much as 25% lower in ‘94 if there had been a similar level of relative effectiveness per
unit of effort during both years.
DISCUSSION
We believe the 3:1 benefit-cost ratio calculated
during preparation of our EA represents a
conservative estimate for several reasons. As
previously noted, we chose to use a more
conservative estimate of losses that could
reasonably be expected in the absence of control
than did the analysis in ADC’s programmatic EIS.
Also, unlike some other economic analyses
(Thompson 1976, USDI 1978, USDA 1994) our
analysis did not consider the economic impact of
predation on other segments of society, such as
manufacturers and consumers. The estimate of
ADC expenses for protecting sheep in the analysis
area has probably been overstated, which would
also contribute to a reduced benefit-cost ratio.
After determining the average portion of our field
employees time spent protecting sheep, we simply
applied this same factor to the time of the entire
State office staff and considered that amount of
time as support for efforts to protect sheep. In
actuality, the State Director’s time is occupied by a
much greater variety of tasks than this assumption
suggests, so the estimated cost is slightly inflated.
A benefit-cost analysis of ADC activities as
conducted back in the decades of widespread
toxicant use would likely show a much higher
benefit per unit cost than predator damage
management programs as currently practiced.
Computer simulation modeling of various coyote
control options suggests that, in general, control
programs employing toxicants provide the greatest
net economic benefits (Gum et al. 1978). Cain et
al. (1972) noted that toxicants were “conspicuously
effective and economical” for predator control, but
that they were also generally less selective.

Although toxicants were cheap and very effective at
keeping predator numbers and predation losses
low, there were strong societal concerns about
some of the environmental impacts of their use.
Our social value system has essentially established
limits on how cost-effectively wildlife damage
management can be conducted. As restrictions on
use of damage management methods increase,
cost-effectiveness is reduced (Connolly 1981).
Cost-effectiveness of various control strategies
can vary greatly depending on a variety of factors.
Effectiveness of aerial hunting efforts, for instance,
can vary with the presence or absence of fresh
snow cover, as well as use of a ground crew to
locate coyotes, prior use of draw stations to attract
coyotes, and other factors. The benefit-cost ratios
discussed in this paper fall generally within the
range of those discussed by other authors. USDA
(1994) suggested a 2.4:1 benefit:cost ratio for
predator control efforts to protect sheep in the
western U.S., and Wagner (1997) suggested a
2.6:1 benefit-cost ratio for helicopter aerial hunting
efforts to protect sheep in Utah and Idaho.
Thompson (1976) suggested a 3.9:1 benefit-cost
ratio with

trapping as the primary control tool in California,
and Pearson and Caroline (1981) estimated a
benefit-cost ratio of 4.5:1 for predator control
during a one-year analysis period in Texas.
Connolly (1981), suggested a 7:1 benefit-cost ratio
for government predator control efforts in the
western U.S. Predator control efforts may not be
cost-effective in all circumstances, but the reasons
for this may involve the need to address social or
environmental concerns that are difficult to quantify
in economic terms.
LITERATURE CITED
Cain, S.A., J.A. Kadlec, D.L. Allen, R.A. Cooley,
M.C. Hornocker, A.S. Leopold, and F.H.
Wagner. 1972. Predator Control--1971:
Report to the Council on Environmental
Quality and the U.S. Department of the
Interior by the Advisory Committee on
Predator Control. Univ. Mich. Press, Ann
Arbor. 207 pp.
Connolly, G.E. 1981. On cost effectiveness of
coyote control to protect livestock. Pages
279-294 in Peek, J.M. and P.D. Dalke, eds.
1982. Wildlife-Livestock Relationships
Symposium: Proceedings 10. University
of Idaho, Forest, Wildlife and Range
Experiment Station, Moscow, ID.
Delorenzo, D.G. and V.W. Howard.
1976.
Evaluation of sheep losses on a range
lambing operation without predator control
in southeastern New Mexico. Final Report
to USFWS, Denver Wildlife Research
Center, New Mexico State Univ., Las
Cruces.
Gum, R.L., L.M. Arthur, and R.S. Magleby.
1978.
Coyote control: A simulation
evaluation of alternative strategies. Agric.
Economic Rep. No. 408, Nat. Res. Div.,
Economics, Statistics and Cooperative
Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
49 pp.
Henne, D.R. 1975. Domestic sheep mortality on a
western Montana ranch. MS Thesis, Univ.
Montana, Missoula. 53 p.
Howard, V.W., Jr., and R.E. Shaw.
1978.
Preliminary assessment of predator damage
to the sheep industry in southeastern New
Mexico. Agric. Exp. Stn., New Mexico
State Univ., Las Cruces. Res. Rpt. 356.
and T.W. Booth. 1981. Domestic sheep
mortality in southeastern New Mexico. Agric.
Exp. Stn., New Mexico State Univ., Las Cruces.
Bull. 683.

IASS. 1996. Idaho Agricultural Statistics Service.
1996 Idaho Agricultural Statistics. pp.
66-68.
McAdoo, J.K. and D.A. Klebenow.
1978.
Predation on range sheep with no predator
control. J. Range Manage. 31(2):111-114.
Munoz, J.R. 1977. Cause of sheep mortality at the
Cook
Ranch,
Florence,
Montana.
1975-1976.
MS Thesis.
Univ. of
Montana, Missoula. 55 pp.
Nass, R.D. 1977. Mortality associated with range
sheep operations in Idaho. J. Range
Manage. 30:253-258.
. 1980. Efficacy of predator damage
control programs. Proc. Vertebrate Pest
Conf. 9:205-208.
O’Gara, B.W., K.C. Brawley, J.R. Munoz, and
D.R. Henne. 1983. Predation on domestic
sheep on a western Montana ranch. Wildl.
Soc. Bull. 11:253-264.
O’Toole, R. 1994. Audit of the USDA Animal
Damage Control program.
CHEC
Research Paper No. 31. Cascade Holistic
Economic Consultants, 14417 S.E. Laurie,
Oak Grove, OR 97267.
Packham, C.J. 1973. Coyote damage control with
helicopters in selected areas of Idaho.
Unpublished report in ADC files, Boise,
ID. 12 pp.
Pearson, E.W. 1986. A literature review of
livestock losses to predators in western
U.S. Denver Wildlife Research Center,
Bldg. 16, Denver Federal Center, Denver
CO 80225. Unpubl. Rpt. 20 pp.
Pearson, E.W. and M. Caroline. 1981. Predator
control in relation to livestock losses in
central Texas. J. Range Management.
34(6):435-441.
Thompson, R.A. 1976. The cost of predator
damage control using trapping as the
primary control technique. Proc. Vertebrate
Pest Conf. 7:146-153.
USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, Animal Damage Control. 1994.
Final Environmental Impact Statement.
USDA-APHIS-ADC, Operational Support
Staff, 6505 Belcrest Rd., Rm. 820, Fed.
Bldg., Hyattsville, MD 20782.
USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, Animal Damage Control. 1996.
Environmental Assessment on Predator
Damage Management in Southern Idaho.
USDA-APHIS-ADC, 1828 Airport Way,
Boise, ID 83705.

USDI, 1978. Predator damage in the West: A
study of coyote management alternatives.
US Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington,
DC. 789 pp.
Wagner, F.H. 1988. Predator Control and the
Sheep Industry: The Role of Science in Policy
Formation. Regina Books. Claremont, CA.
230 pp.

Wagner, K.K. 1997. (In prep.) Preventative
predation management: An evaluation of
winter aerial coyote hunting in the
intermountain west. Ph.D. Dissert. Utah State
University. Logan, UT.
Wywialowski, A.P. 1994. Agricultural producers’
perceptions of wildlife-caused losses. Wildl.
Soc. Bull. 22:370-382.

